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Abstract 
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drawing on both economic and institutionalist theories. Several institutional attributes 
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Introduction 
 
Trainee pay is central to the economics of work-based training, dividing the cost between the 
employer and the trainee, and thus influencing incentives to offer and to undertake training. It is a 
recurrent matter of policy interest, as seen in calls in Britain and Germany for apprentice pay to be cut 
in order to increase training volume (Steedman, 2008; Wagner, 1999; Woessman, 2004). German 
governments, at both federal and Land levels, have encouraged employers to offer more training in 
return for trade union acceptance of lower apprentice pay (BMBF, 1999; Hyman, 2001: 137-40). This 
is however controversial: both the effectiveness and the feasibility of cuts in apprentice pay have been 
questioned (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999; Beicht, 2011; Garonna and Ryan, 1991). 
 The first line of research of potential relevance to an understanding of trainee pay is human 
capital theory. Economists typically assume that trainee pay is set competitively, by clearing the 
market for training places (Becker, 1964). However, human capital theory does not readily explain 
differences between countries in the attributes of work-based training. Institutionalists focus 
specifically on such issues, relating national outcomes to the collective organization of employers and 
employees, and to national political systems. They have however paid little attention to the role of 
trainee pay in national systems of skill formation (Busemeyer and Trampusch, 2012; Hall and 
Soskice, 2001).  
 This article examines apprenticeship, the longest and costliest form of work-based training, 
which combines work-based learning with vocational education and is subject to externally mandated 
training standards. We consider three countries, Britain, Germany and Switzerland, with marked 
institutional differences. We focus on metalworking, in which apprenticeship provides in all three 
countries the principal route to intermediate skills, and does so with exceptional similarity of training 
standards. In that sector, apprentice pay as a proportion of that of skilled workers stood (around 2005) 
at 40.9, 29.2 and 14.1 percent in Britain, Germany and Switzerland respectively, a pattern that 
paralleled that in the economy as a whole (Ryan et al., 2011: Table 23). We use our fieldwork and 
national survey data to analyse these substantial differences. 
 We first discuss theories of apprentice pay, followed by research context and methods, and 
then present evidence on pay-setting and outcomes. Twelve potential determinants are considered, 
grouped and used for pair-wise comparative analysis. More detail is provided in Ryan et al. (2010, 
2011). 
 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Human capital theory 
 
In economic theory, trainee pay is determined by the amount and type of skill learned, and by the 
balance of supply and demand in ‘training markets’: labour markets that implicitly contain 
opportunities to learn that skill. Three factors potentially change the demand and supply curves in 
training markets, and thus the price at which the market clears: the nature of the skill, the demand for 
trainees by employers, and the supply of potential trainees.  
  Assuming perfect competition in all markets --- if skills are ‘general’ --- trainee pay adjusts so 
as to allocate the entire cost of training to the trainee. Any investment that a firm makes in its trainees’ 
skills has to be recouped by underpaying its skilled workers, creating an incentive for them to quit, 
which in turn denies the firm a return on its investment. For a costly skill, trainee pay is therefore low 
(Becker, 1964). Assuming diversity in both production technologies and youth occupational 
preferences, differences in demand and supply conditions affect trainee pay. If more employers 
require the skill, the demand for trainees is higher, and (ceteris paribus) so is trainee pay. If more 
qualified young people seek training, supply is higher, and trainee pay therefore lower. These factors 
potentially vary by company, sector, occupation and country.  
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 The assumption that the pay of skilled employers is set by competitive market clearing has 
become less central to human capital theory. Post-Becker variants commonly assume that employers 
have monopsony (buyer) power over their skilled employees, reflecting inter alia the cost to 
employees of finding and moving to another job. The firm then pays its skilled workers less than the 
value of their output, which requires it to pay its trainees more than it would under perfect 
competition for skilled workers --- and it can now do so without facing an excessive reduction in the 
return on its investment (Stevens, 1994).  
 However, most such models still assume that the market for training places is perfectly 
competitive and trainee pay is set by market-clearing (Leuven, 2005; Stevens, 1999). Some do assume 
that pay is negotiated by trade unions, which are assumed to seek lower pay inequality between 
members, resulting in an exogenous, supra-competitive wage floor for trainees (Acemoglu and 
Pischke, 1999). However, unions might be expected instead to bargain more strongly for skilled 
workers than for trainees, in which case trade unionism would be associated with lower (relative) 
trainee pay. Moreover, in the absence of collective bargaining, employers might enjoy monopsony 
power over trainees, not just skilled employees, leading to lower trainee pay than under perfect 
competition (Backes-Gellner and Mohrenweiser, 2010; Mühlemann et al., 2013; Wolter and Ryan, 
2011). 
 Taken as a whole, human capital theory predicts that the pay of apprentices will be low in 
markets for training places when the total cost of training is high; when the productivity and pay of 
skilled workers are high (as trainees can then anticipate a high return to training); when the demand 
for skill by employers is low; when the supply of young people interested in and eligible for training 
for the occupation is high; and, under non-competitive pay setting, when either trade unions do not 
seek higher relative pay for trainees or employers possess monopsony power over trainees. 
 
 
Institutional theory 
 
Although human capital theory treats trainee pay as a central variable, it cannot explain why it and 
other attributes of apprenticeship vary greatly across countries (Wolter and Ryan, 2011). ‘Varieties of 
Capitalism’ and related institutionalist approaches see apprenticeship as depending on institutional 
support, specifically from employers’ associations, trade unions and collective bargaining (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Crouch et al., 2001; Streeck and Yamamura, 2001; Thelen, 2004). Little attention has 
been paid to trainee pay, however, despite interest in the economic incentive to agents to offer and 
accept training (Busemeyer and Trampusch, 2012; Soskice, 1994; Trampusch, 2010). Nor do wider 
studies of employment relations consider trainee pay among the potential effects of collective 
organization by employees and employers (Hyman, 1999; Traxler et al., 2001). 
 Some development of institutionalist analysis is therefore required. We start from the 
dichotomy between coordinated and liberal market economies (CMEs and LMEs). The key difference 
in relation to apprenticeship is the extent to which training-related actions involve simply 
decentralized decisions based on rational self-interest, as is assumed for LMEs, including the UK, or 
are influenced, whether by exhortation, pressure or constraint by collective interests (employers’ 
associations and chambers, trade unions and works councils) and by state bodies, as is assumed for 
CMEs, including Germany.  
 Apprentice pay is expected to depend in LMEs primarily on the balance of supply and 
demand in markets for training places. We therefore hypothesise that, as youth joblessness is 
particularly high in LMEs, apprentice pay will be lower in countries such as the UK, where trainee 
pay should be affected more strongly by youth competition for training places (Popiunik and Ryan, 
2012). In CMEs, including Germany and Switzerland, apprentice pay is expected to depend not on 
simple market competition but rather on the power and goals of the representatives of employers and 
employees, and on the public institutions, particularly education systems, which jointly affect the 
demand for and supply of eligible and interested young people.  
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 What are the expected objectives of representatives of employers and employees? Employers 
would prefer low apprentice pay, to minimize training costs. As we focus on relative pay, this should 
hold for larger and smaller companies alike. The interests of employee representatives are more 
complex. The goals of unions and works councils may not include high pay for trainees. Low 
apprentice pay might be preferred when apprentices are few or weakly organized within the 
membership; when the recruitment of new members is not a priority; when employers do not use 
apprentices as cheap labour; and when unions want more training opportunities for young people 
(Ryan, 1987). 
 We therefore hypothesise that apprentice pay will be lower among CMEs: first, when 
employers’ associations are more powerful than unions and works councils in the meso-level bodies 
that regulate training, including pay setting; and, second, when the balance of power between the two 
sides is less unequal, but unions and councils accept low apprentice pay in order to increase the 
supply of training by employers. 
 Finally, the interests and actions of public agents potentially affect apprentice pay (Crouch et 
al., 1999: 109-34). Governments in many countries, including the three studied here, promote 
apprenticeship training. The scale and effectiveness of those efforts may however differ. We 
hypothesise that in CMEs public policy is geared more systematically than in LMEs to the 
institutional buttressing of apprenticeship, including the promotion of lower apprentice pay, whether 
directly or indirectly. The ways in which governments may pursue that goal include social 
partnership, financial subsidies to training, the legal attributes of apprenticeship contracts, and the 
functioning of the education system. 
 An institutionalist approach therefore adds to the microeconomic incentives emphasised by 
human capital theory a role for collective action as influencing apprentice pay, both through market 
forces and despite them. 
 
 
Focus and context 
 
We focus on apprenticeship for intermediate (traditionally, craft and technician) skills in 
metalworking in Britain, Germany and Switzerland. Our country choice is motivated by large 
differences in apprentice pay (above); our choice of sector and occupation, by the similarity in 
metalworking of training content across the three countries and the importance of metalworking skills 
for economic performance. 
 The ratio of apprentices to employment in the economy as a whole in 2007-08 was only 0.7 
per cent in Britain (England, Level 3 only), as compared to 6.5 and 4.8 per cent in in Germany and 
Switzerland (Ryan et al., 2011: Table 8). British programmes have less educational content and lower 
training standards than German and Swiss ones (Steedman, 2010). In metalworking, cross-national 
differences are smaller. The apprentice-employment ratio is 2.4, 5.8 and 4.9 per cent in Britain, 
Germany and Switzerland, respectively.
1
 Also, the quality of training differs little by country. In all 
three countries apprenticeship lasts 3.5 to 4 years, ordinances governing the content of its work-based 
component are set by external, publicly empowered bodies, and first-year apprentices spend at least 
80 per cent of their time away from production. 
 
 
Sources of evidence 
 
Our evidence comes primarily from on-site interviews conducted between April 2008 and May 2009 
in twenty-four plants with senior managers, mostly in human resources/personnel functions (Table 1). 
We also interviewed officials of sectoral trade unions and employers’ associations, and 
representatives of government and other interested organizations. Target plants were matched across 
countries, choosing products (four-digit SIC code) for which comparable plants existed in all three: 
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pumps, turbines, compressors and transport control systems. The plants comprise a variety of product 
lines and batch sizes, ranging from large batches of small pumps to one-off large turbines. 
 Our sample is dominated by mid-sized plants owned by large transnational companies and 
accounting by country for between five and eleven per cent of parent employment (Table 1). Thirteen 
are owned by companies that operate at least one of the other plants in the sample, in one or both of 
the other countries. Although actually training apprentices was not a condition for inclusion, all 24 
plants do so. The plants are regionally concentrated in all countries: in England, in western Germany 
and in German-speaking Swiss cantons. The volume of training, measured by the average ratio of 
apprentices to production employees in the relevant occupation, is similar in the British and German 
samples (7.2 and 7.8 per cent) but higher in Switzerland (12.8 per cent), and in all three countries 
higher than the mean in metalworking as a whole. High standard deviations indicate large differences 
in training volume between plants in each country. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Apprentice pay in sample companies 
 
Pay is measured here as base rates, excluding overtime, performance bonuses and additional (13th 
month) pay.
2
 In pursuit of valid comparisons across time and place, apprentice pay is measured, here 
as elsewhere, in relative terms, as a percentage of skilled pay in the same sector and occupation.  In 
our sample too, apprentice pay varies greatly by country. In the Swiss plants, apprentices receive on 
average 19.5 per cent of skilled pay, as against 33.4 per cent in Germany and 63.5 per cent in Britain. 
These inter-country differences exceed those in national surveys, particularly for Britain (above). The 
key point, however, is that the ranking of countries is the same and the differences between countries 
are large in both sources. 
 
 
Determinants of apprentice pay: evidence 
 
Why would apprentice pay differ across the three countries? Institutional theories emphasise the 
organized interests of employers and employees, and the mode and content of state intervention. We 
group the relevant institutional attributes into those three categories. Human capital theory emphasises 
differences in the skill content of production technologies, the demand for trainees by employers, and 
the supply of young people to training (Stevens, 1999). In our sample of metalworking employers, 
however, only supply conditions differ substantially. The demand side is marginalized by the 
limitation of our sample to employers who train apprentices, and their use of skills and their training 
programmes are similar across the three countries. The third attribute, the supply of potential trainees, 
does however differ substantially by country. 
 Table 2 summarizes the explanatory variables indicated by these theories, and their ratings for 
the three countries. We do not dichotomize institutions and markets, nor economic and institutional 
theories, but rather treat all institutional attributes as affecting apprentice pay within training markets. 
Normally one would analyse intra-country as well as inter-country differences in apprentice pay, but 
that is not possible as most of our variables are national attributes that vary more between countries 
than between plants. 
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Table 2 about here 
 
Trade unions 
 
The theories discussed above predict that two aspects of trade unionism affect apprentice pay: 
collective bargaining coverage, and whether unions seek to raise apprentice (relative) pay. Economy-
wide, bargaining coverage is higher in Germany than in Switzerland or Britain, at 63, 48 and 34 per 
cent respectively (Visser, 2011). Lacking representative data for metalworking, we turn to our sample 
of plants. The great majority are covered by a collective agreement, at either sector level (Germany 
and Switzerland) or company or plant level: seven of the eight establishments in Germany and 
Britain, and six in Switzerland. However the Swiss sectoral agreement does not cover any pay 
category; in the absence of effective union representation at the workplace, companies can in effect 
determine this for themselves (ASM, 2006). Moreover, though apprentice pay was covered by 
collective bargaining in all seven German plants covered by a collective agreement, this was the case 
in only one British plant. We therefore rate bargaining coverage for metalworking apprentices ‘high’ 
in Germany and ‘low’ in the other two countries. 
 We rely on interviews for evidence on trade union objectives. A senior official in the pay 
policy department of IG Metall states that his union would like apprentices to receive 35 to 40 per 
cent of the craft rate, rather than 30 to 35 per cent as at present. This reflects the importance the union  
attaches to the recruitment and integration of young members, as shown by the substantial resources 
devoted to its internal organization for apprentices and young workers (IGM, 2010). Nevertheless, the 
union does not give priority to higher pay for apprentices: the desired increase is not large, nor does it 
currently feature on the list of negotiating demands --- in contrast to the union’s contemporary pursuit 
of a right to an indefinite employment contract for all apprentices on completion of training.  
 In Switzerland, the leading union, Unia, not only has no role in pay-setting in metalworking, 
it does not actively seek such a role, particularly for apprentices, nor would it want higher apprentice 
pay. An official told us that her union would prefer, not a general increase in apprentice pay, but 
rather increases in the very low rates offered by particular companies, and the payment of a thirteenth 
month to the one-third of apprentices who do not receive it. She attributes the union’s stance both to 
its concern for the supply of training places and to the weakness of its youth organization, caused 
partly by a lack of resources for recruiting apprentices. 
 In Britain, a regional official of Unite, the largest union in metalworking, responsible for pay 
negotiations in three of the largest plants in our sample, states that, although the union prefers high 
apprentice pay, it does not actively pursue that goal: it sees no need, given the high rates typically 
offered by employers. His view is corroborated by managers. A highly unionized pump producer, 
which no longer negotiates apprentice pay, still pays the high rates of the last (1988) sectoral pay 
agreement, drawn up when the union was considerably stronger than it is today. The personnel 
manager confirms that the union’s lack of interest in apprentice pay results from the firm’s high pay 
rates. 
 Apprentice pay might also be influenced by employee representation at the workplace, in 
works councils or similar bodies --- particularly in Germany, where councils, legally mandated in all 
but the smallest plants, possess codetermination powers over training, and, despite their formal 
exclusion from pay setting, informally influence pay at plant level (Thelen, 1991). All our German 
plants, and almost all our Swiss ones, have a functioning works council. However, in only one case, a 
British plant with a consultative committee, have workplace representatives shown interest in 
apprentice pay, as opposed to training methods and a right to employment for apprentices after 
training. Managers typically attribute lack of interest in apprentice pay to low representation of 
apprentices, and more fundamentally to lack of discontent about pay among apprentices themselves, 
in Switzerland as well as Germany. We therefore rate ‘low’ union interest in raising apprentice pay in 
Britain and Switzerland, and ‘medium’ in Germany. 
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Employers’ associations 
 
As noted above, economic models commonly assume that trainee pay in the absence of collective 
bargaining is set by competitive market clearing, but that may not be the case where pay is 
coordinated by employers’ associations. In Switzerland, sectoral associations have an overall 
coverage rate around 80 per cent at national level, compared to 60 per cent in Germany and only 35 
per cent in Britain (Visser, 2011). The same ranking of countries applies in metalworking: the three 
largest Swiss associations cover at least two-thirds of employment, as against one-half in Germany 
(according to a senior Gesamtmetall official), and undoubtedly much less in Britain, where sectoral 
bargaining ended in 1990 and the Engineering Employers’ Federation (EEF), having survived large 
membership losses, now claims to represent only one-quarter of companies.
3
 
 Employers’ associations play central roles in the organization of apprenticeship in both 
Germany and Switzerland: they are represented on the sector committees that draw up and revise skill 
profiles and training ordinances for particular occupations. In Germany, unions have parity of 
representation on those committees. In Switzerland, by contrast, the employers’ association normally 
is the committee: a government official estimates that around 90 per cent of regulatory committees 
(Berufsverbände) comprise one or more sectoral employers’ associations. Those committees are 
required to consult other interested parties, including trade unions and educators. However, our 
interviewees, in government and trade unions alike, see Swiss unions as typically neither well-
resourced nor interested enough to participate at sector level, leaving the field in effect to employers’ 
associations --- a view shared by Trampusch (2010) and Gonon and Maurer (2012).  
 Our evidence points to the coordination of pay-setting in Switzerland by employers’ 
associations. Formally speaking, this is not the case: neither of the two largest metalworking 
associations– Swissmem for larger companies and Swissmechanic for smaller ones – conducts pay 
bargaining, nor does either make pay recommendations to its members (Oesch, 2007). Formally, they 
confine themselves to collecting and compiling data on apprentice pay at establishment level. 
Informally, however, pay coordination appears important, centred on the circulation to members of 
the results of their pay surveys. Two well-placed observers --- officials of the federal government and 
of one metalworking association --- both see these surveys as the means to avoid pay-based 
competition for apprentices. By contrast, they see non-price competition for potential trainees, on 
company reputation, the content of training and the timing of recruitment, as widespread and intense.  
 How might any such pay coordination through employers’ associations survive profit-seeking 
individualism? Extension rules can make an association’s recommendations legally binding, on non-
members as well as members, and that is the case for the content of apprenticeship. But they do not 
feature in Swiss pay setting. We take employers’ cohesion to depend instead on the limited size and 
strong social norms of Swiss business communities, with their dense networks of associational 
contacts (Soskice, 1990; Eichenberger and Mach, 2011). 
 In Germany, employers’ associations, which in metalworking means Gesamtmetall and its 
regional affiliates, also coordinate pay-setting, and do so formally, by formulating a policy to pursue 
in regional pay negotiations. A growing minority of metalworking firms, including one of our eight 
plants, avoid coverage by the regional Tarif agreement, but even they are influenced by association 
policy, whether informally by simply adhering to the agreement, or formally by the extension rule that 
requires that apprentices receive at least 80 per cent of the relevant Tarif rate (Beicht, 2011). We 
therefore take employer coordination of pay setting to be high in both Germany and Switzerland. 
 In Britain, as in Switzerland, in the near absence of collective bargaining over apprentice pay, 
pay-setting depends on the individual employer, not the employers’ association. The EEF also 
circulates the results of its pay surveys to members, who, according to a senior official, are also 
concerned to keep apprentice pay in line with other employers in their districts. The difference from 
Switzerland consists of lower associational coverage, greater territorial dispersion of employers and 
weaker collective orientation among employers. We take pay coordination by employers’ associations 
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to be low in Britain. The greater dispersion of apprentice pay across plants in Britain (Table 1) is 
consistent with this interpretation. 
 
 
State-related attributes 
 
The state also influences training markets, whether intentionally or not. In Germany and Switzerland, 
public subsidies to apprenticeship are channelled through part-time education, paid directly to 
vocational colleges for courses for which no fees are charged. The costs of workplace training fall 
generally on the employer and the apprentice. In Britain, metalworking apprenticeship similarly 
involves part-time vocational education, provided primarily by public colleges, in which fees are 
either not charged (under-18s) or are publicly subsidized (18 plus). But the mode of public subsidy in 
the Apprenticeships programme is radically different from the German and Swiss approach. Public 
money flows in the first instance not directly to colleges but rather to the principal contractor for an 
Apprenticeship programme as a whole. In metalworking, exceptionally, that is still typically an 
employer, not a specialist training company, even if employers often contract out such functions as 
competence assessment and compliance-related paperwork. Substantial subsidy is involved: in 2007-
08, at least £16,000 (€21,000) for a typical 16-18 year old entrant (Ryan et al., 2011: Table 10).4 
 Although the grant covers less than half the employer’s cost for an engineering apprenticeship 
(Hasluck et al., 2008), and much of that is absorbed by the costs of assessment and administration, it 
can be expected to raise apprentice pay. The extent to which the subsidy benefits the apprentice rather 
than the employer increases as the elasticity (responsiveness) of youth supply with respect to 
apprentice pay falls. By contrast, when public subsidies are paid directly to public colleges, apprentice 
pay is reduced, to the extent that increased access to free part-time education increases youth interest 
in taking training and allows employers to fill training places at lower pay than in the absence of the 
subsidy. The difference between the two scenarios is that, ceteris paribus, the British approach shifts 
the employers’ demand curve up, while the German-Swiss approach shifts the youth supply curve 
down. As we lack estimates of the elasticities of youth supply and employer demand, the subsidy’s 
quantitative effect on apprentice pay remains uncertain, but the direction of its effect is clear. 
 Apprentice pay may also be affected by the extent to which the contractual status of 
apprentices is differentiated from that of regular employees, in both law and practice. When training 
involves a clear distinction between trainees and employees, both contractually and in production, 
employers can more easily pay trainees a low rate, as doing so is then legitimated in the eyes of both 
regular employees and trainees themselves, than when the status of trainees is close to those of regular 
employees, as in simple on-the-job training, in which the principle is typically ‘rate for the job’. 
Apprenticeship training potentially satisfies the former conditions (Marsden and Ryan, 1991). 
 Britain’s higher apprentice pay is consistent with its weaker differentiation of apprenticeship 
from regular employment. Although apprentices in all three countries nowadays have the legal status 
of employee, in Germany and Switzerland the training contract remains central, with the rights and 
duties associated with employee status read in as secondary attributes (Ryan, 2012). In both countries 
the pay of apprentices is formally differentiated from that of employees, as Vergütung in Germany 
and Lehrlingslohn in Switzerland, by contrast to wages and salaries (Lohn, Gehalt) for employees. 
Indeed, none of our Swiss employers includes apprentices in its general pay increases for employees, 
adhering instead to the absolute monthly amounts that must by law be contractually stipulated at the 
start of training, whereas five of the British and all eight of the German ones do so. The British 
government has promoted, in both administrative practice and recent legislation, ‘employee status’ for 
participants in the Apprenticeships programme. The 2009 Apprenticeships Act stipulates 
paradoxically that an Apprenticeship agreement constitutes an employment contract, not a contract of 
apprenticeship, thereby denying Apprentices some rights traditionally enjoyed by apprentices under 
common law, notably security of tenure during training (Parliament, 2009: 15-16; Ryan, 2012). The 
convergence of Apprenticeship on regular employment may well contribute to the higher pay of 
British apprentices.  
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 Three attributes of national education systems potentially affect apprentice pay, by way of the 
supply side of training markets. The first is ease of access to full-time upper-secondary education. 
Switzerland and Germany both have lower-secondary streams that end in school-leaving certificates 
that promote eligibility for apprenticeship but not (at least, not directly) for full-time upper-secondary 
general education. Young people are steered at the margin towards apprenticeship through the 
limitation of places in full-time general programmes, either at lower-secondary (Germany) or upper-
secondary (Switzerland) level. In both countries, practice varies territorially (by Land and canton, 
respectively). 
 Evidence of rationing at upper-secondary level in Switzerland includes variations in full-time 
participation across cantons, according to the availability of full-time places (Neuenschwander, 2009; 
SKBE/CSRE, 2010: Fig 71). Changes over time point in the same direction: the marginal rate of entry 
to Gymnasium (grammar school) when the youth population cohort expands is only one quarter as 
large as the average rate (Muehlemann et al. 2009). German evidence shows the importance of pupils’ 
social background in inducing primary teachers to recommend that particular students apply for the 
lower two streams in lower-secondary schooling even when their grades or personal attributes make 
them potentially suitable for the top stream (Schnepf, 2002). By contrast, Britain has seen, until 
recently at least, both a predominance of comprehensive lower-secondary schooling and government 
promotion of full-time upper-secondary education, by way of school funding mechanisms, grants for 
‘staying on’ at age 16, and reductions of the learning requirements for secondary qualifications 
(Machin and Vignoles, 2006). The implication is a lower supply of young people to apprenticeship in 
Britain than in Germany and Switzerland. 
 The second educational attribute is the mean age of entry to apprenticeship. The older, more 
educated and more experienced are apprentices, the greater their potential output during training, and, 
under competitive pay setting, their pay during training. Moreover, older apprentices are less likely to 
live with their parents and more likely to have dependents of their own, which also increases the 
minimum pay that will induce them to accept training. The mean age of entry to apprenticeship (all 
occupations) is nearly two years lower in Switzerland (17.6) than in Britain and Germany (19.3 and 
19.4 respectively; Ryan et al., 2010: Table 10). The national pattern is mirrored in metalworking. The 
principal age of entry is 15-17 in all of our Swiss establishments, and in most British and German 
ones as well (11 out of 16), but almost one-third of the British and German plants recruit primarily at 
age 18-20, and the same share take on at least some adults (>20 years; Ryan et al., 2011: Table 12). 
The difference between Switzerland and the two other countries is associated with a lower minimum 
school leaving age than in Britain (15 versus 16 years), and a higher rate of direct movement from 
lower-secondary schooling to apprenticeship than in Germany, where most young people nowadays 
complete post-lower-secondary schooling (Realschule or Gymnasium) before starting apprenticeship. 
The lower age of Swiss apprentices promotes lower apprentice pay than in Britain and Germany. 
 The third educational attribute is the scope for progression from apprenticeship to tertiary 
education, for which Switzerland again stands out. Swiss apprentices can study part-time for a 
vocational upper-secondary qualification (Berufsmaturität) that gives the right to enter full-time 
tertiary education. Around 12 per cent of apprentices do so, whether during training or afterwards 
(BBT, 2010). The option increases the appeal of apprenticeship to young people, particularly more 
ambitious and able ones – and it was introduced in 1994 to do just that (Gonon and Maurer, 2012).  
Neither Germany nor Britain has yet developed a full counterpart. In Germany, educational 
progression from apprenticeship requires either the acquisition of a further school-based qualification 
(Fachoberschulreife), which has only recently and in some Länder been made available during rather 
than after apprenticeship, or the possession before entry of the upper-secondary general qualification 
(Abitur; Nikolai and Ebmer, 2012). Similarly, although some of our British companies have 
informally established progression ladders that comprise tertiary qualifications for their apprentices, 
the sector still lacks options for ambitious apprentices to qualify for full-time higher education during 
training. 
 Differences in the ease of remaining in full-time schooling, the age of apprentices and options 
for educational progression all differentiate the national supply of young people to apprenticeship, and 
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thus potentially also the pay of apprentices. Switzerland and Britain occupy the opposite poles on all 
three factors, with Germany standing closer to Switzerland on the first one and closer to Britain on the 
other two. 
 
 
Market conditions 
 
The final group of potential influences on training markets comprises three variables that do not in 
principle depend directly on trade unions, employers’ associations or the state. The first concerns 
educational outcomes and youth motivation; the other two, conditions in related markets. 
 The supply of potential apprentices depends not only on the structural attributes of national 
educational systems but also on educational outcomes within those structures: specifically, the 
qualifications and motivation of school-leavers. We rely here on interview evidence. The British 
employers in our sample report lower ratios of acceptable applications to apprenticeship vacancies 
than do the German and Swiss. Acceptable applications exceed vacancies in all three countries, with 
mean ratios of 3.2, 11.6 and 7.2 respectively. However, the lower British ratio allows employers less 
scope to choose among applicants. Three of them express particular concern about the supply of 
applicants, which they attribute variously to: low educational attainments, particularly in science and 
mathematics; the sector’s record of employment decline and redundancy; the low status of craft 
apprenticeship in the eyes of many parents and teachers; and a widespread preference for full-time 
education among the more qualified 16-18 year olds. 
 Differences within countries are also marked. Two large British turbine manufacturers with 
strong corporate reputations attract a large number of acceptable applications, despite accounting for a 
considerable share of local employment. Nor are all German and Swiss firms free from supply 
problems. A German turbine manufacturer, based in a city with high unemployment, opted in a recent 
year, given disappointing applications, not to fill any of its few vacancies for apprentices. Two of the 
three smallest plants in the Swiss sample reported at most two acceptable applicants per vacancy.  
 Apprentice pay is expected to depend also on conditions in two related markets, those for 
unskilled and for skilled labour. Human capital theory sees the market for unskilled labour as 
providing school-leavers with the principal alternative to apprenticeship. In Britain, although 
opportunities for unskilled youth employment have shrunk since the 1970s (Roberts, 1995), an 
experienced official of the Sector Skills Council sees them as still extensive enough to compete with 
apprenticeship, in terms of both availability and appeal. Low-skilled work is also available to young 
people in Germany and Switzerland, particularly in the service sectors of large urban areas. Our 
interviewees emphasise however the high social value attached to possession of a skilled occupational 
qualification (Berufsprinzip) as reducing interest in such work among school-leavers. We therefore 
rate this factor as promoting lower youth supply to apprenticeship in Britain. 
 Finally, conditions in the market for skilled labour are expected in human capital theory to 
shape expectations among would-be apprentices concerning the gain in lifetime earnings derived from 
training, which comprises both higher employment probability and higher pay when employed, as 
compared to having chosen less-skilled employment instead. The larger both are, the lower the pay 
that young people will rationally accept during training. (We exclude here prospects for subsequent 
occupational progression from skilled occupations, for which few data are available.) 
 Recent levels of skilled pay and unemployment may be taken to dominate the expectations of 
young people. The differential between skilled and semi-skilled pay in metalworking is similar in 
Switzerland and Britain, 36 and 32 per cent respectively, and lower in Germany, 14 per cent (Ryan et 
al., 2011: Table 27). Fewer data are available for expectations of being in work, and in all three 
countries some worsening must have occurred, associated with industrial restructuring and extensive 
redundancies. In the absence of unemployment data at sector-occupation level, we turn to national 
unemployment rates, which, during 1998-2007 averaged 5.3, 9.2 and 3.3 per cent in Britain, Germany 
and Switzerland respectively. Considering both pay differentials and unemployment experience, we 
therefore rate the expected private return to training (in pecuniary terms, and excluding the social 
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status of skill) as higher in Switzerland than in Germany and Britain. Expectations of a higher 
financial return to training are therefore consistent with lower pay for Swiss than for German and 
British apprentices. 
 
 
Interpretation 
 
With three observations and twelve potential determinants, no definitive analysis of causality is 
possible, as is often the case in comparative research. Progress may however be possible, by grouping 
variables and using analytical comparative methods. 
 If the explanatory variables are grouped, in this case by institutional category, and if all 
variables in a group have the same predicted effect on the dependent variable in a particular 
comparison, the group can be treated as a single composite variable. The relative contribution of the 
component variables cannot be determined, but their combined effect may be visible. The relevant 
comparative methodology is Mill’s method of difference, applied to pair-wise comparisons of 
countries. Analytically the most favourable situation involves two countries for which all but one of 
the independent variables (or groups of variables) take the same values. The difference in national 
outcomes can then be attributed to the difference in that variable (or variable group).
5
 We now 
consider the three possible pair-wise national comparisons, using the four variable groups in Table 2. 
Table 3 shows the predicted effect on apprentice pay of the ratings assigned to the variable groups in 
particular pair-wise comparisons. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 Mill’s ideal is almost realised in the German-Swiss comparison. The values taken by most of 
the variables in three of the groups --- employers’ associations, state-related and training markets --- 
are rated ‘same’ in both countries, and are therefore ruled out as causes of the difference in apprentice 
pay. By contrast, trade unionism differs markedly, and its predicted effect on pay has the right sign: in 
Germany, both bargaining coverage and union interest in raising apprentice pay are greater than in 
Switzerland, and both variables promote higher apprentice pay (Dionisius et al., 2009). 
 Nevertheless, trade unionism cannot be taken to be the sole cause of the pay difference 
between the two countries. Some variables in the other three groups also differ, and do so in a manner 
consistent with the difference in relative pay: specifically, Germany’s lower coverage by employers’ 
associations, higher mean age of entry, weaker progression options and lower private returns. The 
inference is that some mixture of these differences and those in the two trade unionism variables 
generates the difference in pay between the two countries, though the relative importance of those six 
variables cannot be determined. 
 The British-Swiss comparison, by contrast, involves almost the exact opposite of Mill’s ideal: 
differences in all explanatory groups except one. Even so, some explanatory insight can be achieved. 
As there is no major difference in the trade unionism group, causality cannot be sought here. 
However, all ten variables in the other three groups promote higher pay in Britain. We infer therefore 
that some combination of those ten variables causes the pay difference. The inference is again weak, 
in that the relative importance of individual variables cannot be determined. However, as all ten take 
values consistent with higher pay in Britain, and assuming that most or all of them make some 
contribution to the difference in pay, a remarkable congruence can be inferred: complementarities 
within a range of institutional and market attributes, not necessarily in the strong sense that their 
effects interact, though that may be so, but at least in the simultaneous presence of all of them, which 
is unlikely to be purely coincidental (Crouch, 2010). 
 Finally, the British-German comparison sees the same contrast in three of the variable groups 
(employers, state, and market conditions) as in the British-Swiss one, reflecting the similarity of 
Germany and Switzerland on most variables. Age of entry, progression options and private returns to 
training are rated ‘same’ and can therefore be ruled out as causes. But the difference in trade unionism 
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is predicted to favour lower pay in Britain. The combined effect of differences in the other variables 
(employers, subsidy mode, contractual status, educational access, lower secondary attainments, appeal 
of unskilled work) are therefore taken to outweigh trade unionism in causing higher pay in Britain. 
 A further inference becomes possible when the three pair-wise comparisons are considered 
together. Taking Switzerland as the base case, the larger difference in apprentice pay relative to 
Britain than to Germany suggests that the many attributes, related to employers’ associations, the state 
and the training market, that are taken to generate higher pay in Britain are jointly more powerful than 
trade unionism as causes of higher apprentice pay. The inference is consistent with the view that 
German unions have opted not to use their power to the full when negotiating apprentice pay. 
 Our evidence cannot identify any hierarchical relationships among the explanatory variables. 
For instance, contractual status may interact with market conditions. The British government has 
promoted employee status for Apprentices in order to improve the programme’s appeal to young 
people, by dissociating it from the poor reputation of antecedent labour market programmes. 
Contractual status therefore partly reflects political concerns about youth supply to training. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
We draw on both economic and institutionalist theories of training to investigate why apprentice pay 
in metalworking is higher in Britain than in Germany, and lower in Switzerland. The evidence clearly 
contradicts the hypothesis that Britain, as a liberal market economy, would have lower pay than 
Germany and Switzerland, as coordinated market economies. Higher apprentice pay in Britain is 
attributed to a range of factors, including both the institutional thinness of a liberal market economy 
(weakness of trade unions, employers’ associations, and the education system) and the balance of 
supply and demand in markets for training places (in particular, shortages of qualified and interested 
applicants). The contribution of individual variables cannot be determined from our evidence, but 
their combined effect is strong. 
 Low apprentice pay in Switzerland is attributed primarily to low bargaining coverage and 
trade union passivity (relative to Germany in particular), accompanied by informal, monopsonistic 
pay-setting by employers, and to key attributes of the education system, notably the steering of school 
pupils away from full-time upper secondary studies and the erection of ladders for educational 
progression from apprenticeship. The impressive range of state-related, educational and market 
factors that buttress apprenticeship in Switzerland, and to a lesser extent in Germany, suggests 
important complementarities among those factors, which may well be necessary for the two most 
successful apprenticeship systems in the modern world to combine large volume and high quality 
while avoiding high apprentice pay. 
 The additional ingredients in the Swiss case are the near-absence of collective bargaining over 
apprentice pay, which permits unilateral coordination by employers’ associations; lower age of entry; 
easier educational progression from apprenticeship; and higher private returns to training. The lower 
cost of training to employers and the larger scale of apprenticeship in Switzerland than in Germany 
reflect these differences. 
 The evidence is not consistent with the assumption, made in some economic models, that 
trade unions invariably reduce pay differentials between trainees and skilled workers. The assumption 
was relevant historically in British and German metalworking, but it is no longer appropriate. IG 
Metall does prefer higher apprentice pay, but not much higher, and does not make it an active 
negotiating demand. Its Swiss counterpart would not want to raise apprentice pay, even had it the 
power to do so, for fear of reducing the supply of training places. 
 The limitations of our results include the impossibility of establishing from them the separate 
contributions of the various determinants of apprentice pay, particularly higher pay in Britain. There 
is also the standard problem in cross-sectional research, of holding constant unmeasured national 
attributes, notably culture and social values, which potentially include greater adult support for slow 
maturation by young people in Switzerland than in Britain. Finally, employer demand for skill may 
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well be lower in British metalworking – though that would reinforce, not contradict, the dominance of 
supply factors, as depressed demand would favour lower apprentice pay in Britain. 
 Can these findings be generalized to other sectors? The comparative pay pattern is certainly 
representative for the three economies as a whole, with many of these institutional and market 
attributes also featuring. The analysis must however differ somewhat for other sectors, as the learning 
content of most of Britain’s Apprenticeship programme is much lower than its Germanic counterparts, 
and higher trainee pay is to be expected on that ground alone. 
 At least two issues deserve further research. The first is the extent and methods of informal 
pay coordination by employers’ associations. The second is the intentionality and coherence of public 
action, which may well differ more generally between coordinated and liberal market economies. The 
coherence of public support for apprenticeship in Switzerland, with the early introduction of the 
Berufsmaturität, contrasts with the piecemeal expediency shown by the British government, with its 
denial to Apprentices of the common-law status of apprentice. 
 Finally, these results might suggest that British metalworking apprenticeship is handicapped 
by high apprentice pay. That view would align with the Swiss union’s aversion to raising pay for fear 
of reducing training volume. The effect of higher trainee pay on training is however disputed, as the 
evidence is limited, and some economic models predict more training as a result of higher pay 
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999; Ryan, 2010; Stevens, 1994). We see apprentice pay as depending on 
the many factors that affect supply, demand, and price setting in training markets. The responsiveness 
of employers to apprentice pay may well be low, but that constitutes only one of the factors 
influencing apprentice pay. Indeed, were demand and supply to be both unresponsive to apprentice 
pay, as appears likely, and cyclically variable, as is clearly the case, then even in a liberal market 
economy like the UK employers would undoubtedly strive to avoid the large pay fluctuations that 
would be required by continuous market-clearing. 
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Notes 
 
1
 Lacking official data on apprentice stocks for Britain, we estimate the number of engineering Level 
3 apprentices (for December 2007) from new entries during the previous four years and completions 
during a subsequent (four year lagged) period. Details are available from the authors. 
2
 Earnings-based measures of pay are preferable in principle (Ryan, 2010) but are available from 
national surveys only for Switzerland. 
3
 www.eef.org.uk/about/How+we+work/. 
4
 The advent of the Apprenticeships programme has meant for most occupations a need to distinguish 
between ‘apprenticeship’ (functional category) and ‘Apprenticeship’ (labour market programme). In 
Level 3 metalworking occupations, however, the two definitions align closely, as the requirements of 
the Apprenticeships programme satisfy standard functional definitions, and almost all apprentices 
nowadays come under this programme (Ryan et al., 2007; Ryan, 2012). 
5
 Although some variables, including apprentice pay, are quantitative, most are qualitative, so we 
cannot use Mill’s method of concomitant variation, and discard some quantitative information in 
pursuit of analytical traction (Moses and Knutson, 2007: 94-115). 
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Table 1. Attributes of metalworking establishments studieda 
  
 Employment
b
 Number of apprentices
c
 Training attributes Relative pay of 
apprentices
d
 
 Median Share of 
parent (%) 
Mean Ratio to production 
employment (%) 
Duration 
of training 
Off-the-job 
share year 1  
  
    Mean SD (years) (%) Mean SD 
GB 377   4.7 30   7.2   5.6 3.5 81 63.5 13.1 
DE 500 10.5 68   7.8   8.2 3.5 91 33.4   4.5 
CH 280   9.6 39 12.8 10.3 4.0 81 19.5   2.9 
Note. 
a. Eight plants per country, matched across countries. 
b. All occupations. 
c. Craft occupations in production and maintenance, including Engineering Maintenance (GB), 
Industriemechaniker, Mechatroniker (DE), and Polymechaniker (CH).  
d. Unweighted mean base pay rates for four training years, relative to that of recently qualified skilled 
employees in same occupation. 
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Table 2. Ratings of potential determinants of apprentice pay 
        GB  DE  CH 
Trade unions 
Bargaining coverage for apprentices    low  high  low 
Interest in raising apprentice pay    low  medium low 
Employers’ associations 
Membership coverage, metalworking    low  medium high 
Coordination of pay-setting     no  yes  yes 
State-related         
Public subsidies paid direct to employers   yes  no  no 
Closeness of contracts (apprenticeship and employment)  high  low  low 
Constraints on access to general upper-secondary education weak  strong  strong 
Mean age of entry to apprenticeship    high  high  low 
Options for educational progression from apprenticeship  low  low  high 
Market conditions 
Availability of qualified and interested youth   low  high  high 
Unskilled labour market for youth as alternative   yes  no  no 
Private pecuniary return to training    low  low  high 
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Table 3. Actual and predicted levels of apprentice pay, by variable group, in pair-wise 
national comparisons 
 
Comparative level of apprentice relative pay in the first of the two countries that is predicted by the 
values of that variable group (or particular variables within the group) 
 Actual Predicted  
  Trade unions 
Employers’ 
associations 
State-related 
Market 
conditions 
German-Swiss  higher higher 
higher (1)
a
 
same (1) 
higher (2)
b,c
 
same (3) 
higher (1)
d
 
same (2)  
British-Swiss higher same higher higher higher 
British-German higher lower higher 
higher (3); 
same (2)
b,c
 
higher (2); 
same (1)
d
 
  
Note. Parentheses show the number of variables within the group with that predicted effect (for groups 
in which not all variables have the same predicted effect). 
a.
 employers’ association coverage. 
b.
 mean age of entry. 
c.
 educational progression options. 
d.
 private return to training.  
